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[Crim. Xo. 5317. In Bank. May 13, 1952.]

In re Frances Barr, on behalf of GEORGE BARR, on
Habeas Corpus.
[1] Appeal-Supersedeas-Proceedings on Violation.-Superse-

deas is the usual remedy when an appellant seeks to vacate
proceedings taken in the lower court in violation of a stay
granted by statute.
[S] Divorce-Custody of Children-Appeal-Stay of Proceedings.
-In child custody actions, habeas corpus is a remedy additional to supersedeas to correct violations of a stay granted
by statute pending appeal, since the writ will lie when a person entitled to custody of a minor child is denied possession
thereof.
[3] .Id.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Effect.-Appeal from an
order modifying the custody provisions of a divorce decree
suspends the power of the trial court to enforce such order.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 946,949.)
~. [4] Id.-CustodY of Children-Appeal-Effect.-A perfected appeal in an action for custody of a child automatically consti·
:"
tutes a stay of proceedings and precludes trial court from
interfering with custody as it existed at time of appeal.
[6] Id.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Stay of Proceedings.Where the mother appealed from an order which modified
a divorce decree so as to award custody of a minor child

r

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 242.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 142; Cal.Jur., Habeas
Corpus, § 29; Habeas Corpus, § 78.
Kelt. Dig. References: [lJ Appeal and Error, § 440; [2-8] Divorce, § 288.
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to the father, and the superior court thereafter denied her
Illotion to stay proceedings and directed her to deliver the
child to the father, it was not necessary for her to resist
until she was cited for contempt, and her compliance with
the order was not "voluntary" so as to deprive her of the
right to apply for custody pending appeal pursuant to the
statutory stay of proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 946, 949.)
[6] ld.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Stay of Proceedings.Where trial court erroneously refused to stay enforcement
of an order modifying the custody provisions of a divorce
decree after mother of child had perfected an appeal therefrom, her right to haheas corpus to correct such wrongful
refusal is not affected hy a suhsequent order granting her
visitation rights.
[7] ld. - Custody of Children - Appeal-Stay of Proceedings.While cases will arise where it would not he in the hest interests of the child to remain for the duration of an appeal from
a modification order with the parent previously having custody,
this possihility does not authorize extralegal seizure of the
child hy the other parent or execution of the modification
order hy the trial court in violation of express statutory provisions suspending its power to enforce such order pending
appeal. (Code Civ. Pro c., §§ 946, 949.)
[8] ld.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Effect.-Welfare of a child
imperiled hy remaining with the parent having custody thereof
pending appeal from a modification order awarding such custody to the other parent may he adequately protected hy application to the court having jurisdiction over the appeal or
to the juvenile court.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure custody of a
minor. Writ granted.
Coffey & Velasquez and Jack Coffey for Petitioner.
Paolini & Paolini and Mario G. Paolini for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 17, 1947, a final decree of
divorce was entered dissolving the marriage of Frances Barr
and George Barr. The decree awarded custody of their minor
child to Frances. On.J auuary 10, 1952, upon application by
George, the court modified the decree to award him the custody of the child. On January 14th, Frances filed notice of
appeal from the modification order, and her appeal is presently pending in this court. Frances also filed a motion in
the trial court to stay enforcement of the modification order.
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On January 24th her motion was denied and she was ordered
to deliver the child to George. Later that day she complied
with this order.
On February 5, 1952, upon application by Frances, the court
modified the order of January 10th to grant her visitation
rights. On March 16th, while the child was with Frances
pursuant to the visitation provisions of the February 5th
order, she refused to return the child to George and informed
him that she intended to keep the child. Later that day
George and police officers entered her home and forcibly took
the child. Frances commenced the present habeas corpus
proceeding in this court on March 21st. She contends that
her appeal stayed the January 10th modification order and
that she is therefore entitled to custody of the child pending
.
appeal.
The first question presented is whether this court; can properly issue habeas corpus in this case. [1] Supersedeas is
the usual remedy when an appellant seeks to vacate proceedings taken in the lower court in violation of a stay granted
by statute. (Southern Pac. 00. v. Superior Oourt, 167 Cal.
250,252 [139 P. 69] ; Romine v. OraUe, 83 Cal. 432, 437 [23
P. 525] ; Holcomb v. Juster, 39 Cal.App. 462, 463 [179 P.
445] ; see, also, Estate of Dabney, 37 Ca1.2d 402, 411 .[232
P.2d 481].) [2] In child custody actions, however, habeas
corpus is an additional remedy to correct violations of stay
provisions (In re Lukasik, 108 Cal.App.2d 438, 446 [239 P.
2d492]; In re Browning, 108 Cal.App. 503, 507 [291 P.
650] ; In re Dupes, 31 Cal.App. 698, 701 [161 P. 276]), since
the writ will lie when a person entitled to custody of a minor
child is denied possession thereof. (In re Mathews, 176 Cal.
~ 156, 158 [167 P. 873] ; see 37 Cal.L.Rev. 455, 473-474; 13 Cal.
( Jur. 251~252.)
~.. [3] Turning to the merits of the petition, it is clear that
" the appeal suspended the power of the trial court to enforce
the order modifying the custody provisions of the divorce
decree. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 946, 949; Lerner v. Superior
Oourt, 38 Ca1.2d 676, 680 [242 P.2d 321] ; Ex parte Queirolo, 119 Cal. 635, 636 [51 P. 956] ; In re Dupes, 31 Cal.App.
698,700 [161 P. 276].) [4] " [A] perfected appeal in an action
for the custody of a child automatically constitutes a stay of
proceedings and precludes a trial court from interfering
with custody as it existed at the time of appeal. JJ (Foster v.
r Hoster, 5 Ca1.2d 669, 672 [55 P.2d 1175] ; see In re Lukasik,
, 108 Cal.App.2d 438, 443 [239 P.2d 492].)
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[5] George contends that the foregoing cases are not controlling here on the ground that Frances voluntarily complied with the order appealed from. In his return to the petition for the writ, however, George admits: "That on the
24th day of January, 1952, this Petitioner through her at·
torney representing her at that time made a motion before
the said Superior Court to stay and suspend all proceedings
and enforcement of its Order of January 10th, 1952, awarding custody to the father; that the Superior Court denied
said motion and instead ordered the Plaintiff to deliver said
child to the father in conformity to said Order." (Italics
added.) Frances telephoned George on the evening of the
24th and told him to come to her house and take the child.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that her compliance with the order of the court was "voluntary." It was
not necessary to resist until she was cited for contempt. (Of.
Reitano v. Yankwich, 38 Ca1.2d 1 [237 P.2d 6].)
George relies on De Lemos v. Siddall, 143 Cal. 313, 315
[76 P. 1115]. In that case this court held that habeas corpus
would not lie when the order appealed from was executed
before the appeal was perfected, on the ground that an appeal
preserved the status quo at the time of appeal and did not
operate to undo action taken before the appeal. In the present case the order was executed by the trial court some 10
day's after Frances perfected her appeal.
[6] Frances's right to habeas corpus is not affected by
the February 5th order granting her visitation rights. Since
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify its order
after an appeal had been perfected (Lerner v. Superior Court,
38 Ca1.2d 676, 680-681 [242 P.2d 321]; Vosburg v. Vosburg, 137 Cal. 493 [70 P. 473] ; Browne v. Browne, 60 Cal.
App.2d 637, 642 [141 P.2d 428]), the order of February 5th
did not operate to supersede the order of January 10th.
Accordingly, Frances is not prevented from obtaining habeas
corpus to correct the trial court's erroneous refusal to stay
execution of the January 10th order.
[7] Cases will undoubtedly arise where it would not be
in the best interests of the child to remain for the duration
of the appeal with the parent previously having custody.
For instance, the very reason for modification of an earlier
custody award may be that the parent having custody has
been mistreating the child. In that situation it would obviously be undesirable to leave the child with the appellant.
But this possibility· does not authorize extralegal seizure of
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the child by the other parent or execution of the modification
order by the trial court in violation of the express provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Otherwise, litigants would
be encouraged to seize possession of the child pending appeal
in the hope that in subsequent. habeas corpus proceedings they
could persuade an appellate court that their action was in
the best interests of the child and that it should ratify their
conduct by refusing to issue the writ. As colorfully pointed
out in In re Browning, supra, 108 Cal.App. 503, 507, the child
would be "in the category of a human football whose possession by either parent depends upon the agility, activity and
determination of each."
. [8] The welfare of a child imperiled by remaining with
the parent having custody thereof may be adequately protected by application to the court having jurisdiction over
"the appeal (Gantner v. Gantner, 38 Ca1.2d 691, 692 [242
P;2d 329]) or to the juvenile court. (In re Lukasik, 108
Cal.App.2d 438, 445 [239 P.2d 492].) There is no contention
in the present case that the child may not safely remain with
the mother pending the appeal.
It is ordered that the child be delivered to the petitioner,
who, pending determination of the appeal, is entitled to his
custody pursuant to the terms of the final divorce decree.

J

:.. Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,

.:tT., and Spence, J., concurred.
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